Hey Jay, I wanted to ask for clarification how we should understand the essence and energies being really distinct according to the major real distinction. Does Feser's book there explain anything about it?
Thanks for the reply! I read the paper, and I see that Bradshaw defines the major real as "between two entities (res) that are ‘nonidentical as things in their own right, prior to and independent of any objectifying insight or construction elicited by the human reason’". In addition, Bradshaw also claims that the scotistic formal distinction is the nearest Scholastic correlative to the EED. But you seemed to call the distinction a major real one according to how the Catholics define it, which would be between two individuals (entities) according to Bradshaw. Am I understanding this correctly? Would you agree that the scotistic formal distinction actually is a much better comparison than the scholastic real distinctions?
I used the terminology of the guy in the discussion. These aren't Orthodox distinctions, so we are trying to speak the language of Roman Catholics. The Scotist position is close to the Orthodox view *only on attributes* being more distinct than how Thomists view them. All the positions agree the Persons are really distinct without separation. Ultimately it doesn't matter because the debate hinges on what we participate in, and that's how the Dialogue with a Barlaamite progresses - from the status of the energies to them debating what we partake of. That's why the uncreated light is not a creature for us and for them it is. You aren't deified by a "formal distinction" but a real participation in the uncreated energies, long dogmatized in Ecumenical Councils, which Roman Catholics all deny (uncreated energies I mean), except for the inconsistent position of Uniates: https://jaysanalysis.com/2019/08/10/is-grace-itself-created-or-uncreated/
I definitely myself have some strong suspicion on how participation works in Scholastic schemes. Like the univocity of categories in Scotism or how the divine exemplars in Thomism are seemingly mysteriously, somehow, similar to the universals that constitute substances. Or how formalities and virtualities don't seem to neatly map onto energy, but something is left out.
But I can't help but be curious, what's exactly the terminology of the guy in discussion? Was he not understanding the major real distinction in the same way Bradshaw was?
Sorry if I was unclear, I meant about the Thomist, on what I presume to be a thomist understanding of what a major real distinction meant. Well, I can put it like this, when you said that the distinction between essence and energies and between the energies themselves is a major real distinction, did you mean in the same sense of how Bradshaw writes in the paper?
Hey Jay, I wanted to ask for clarification how we should understand the essence and energies being really distinct according to the major real distinction. Does Feser's book there explain anything about it?
Major real is a later scholastic distinction. The distinction is equally as real as the distinction between Persons according to the Cappadocians and St Gregory against Barlaam. The Bradshaw papers covers it: https://mega.nz/file/idYhkKjS#tphV97FeYs-A5EvSDrp9AIAUTqv0XREe5tttriIzPgo
Thanks for the reply! I read the paper, and I see that Bradshaw defines the major real as "between two entities (res) that are ‘nonidentical as things in their own right, prior to and independent of any objectifying insight or construction elicited by the human reason’". In addition, Bradshaw also claims that the scotistic formal distinction is the nearest Scholastic correlative to the EED. But you seemed to call the distinction a major real one according to how the Catholics define it, which would be between two individuals (entities) according to Bradshaw. Am I understanding this correctly? Would you agree that the scotistic formal distinction actually is a much better comparison than the scholastic real distinctions?
I used the terminology of the guy in the discussion. These aren't Orthodox distinctions, so we are trying to speak the language of Roman Catholics. The Scotist position is close to the Orthodox view *only on attributes* being more distinct than how Thomists view them. All the positions agree the Persons are really distinct without separation. Ultimately it doesn't matter because the debate hinges on what we participate in, and that's how the Dialogue with a Barlaamite progresses - from the status of the energies to them debating what we partake of. That's why the uncreated light is not a creature for us and for them it is. You aren't deified by a "formal distinction" but a real participation in the uncreated energies, long dogmatized in Ecumenical Councils, which Roman Catholics all deny (uncreated energies I mean), except for the inconsistent position of Uniates: https://jaysanalysis.com/2019/08/10/is-grace-itself-created-or-uncreated/
I definitely myself have some strong suspicion on how participation works in Scholastic schemes. Like the univocity of categories in Scotism or how the divine exemplars in Thomism are seemingly mysteriously, somehow, similar to the universals that constitute substances. Or how formalities and virtualities don't seem to neatly map onto energy, but something is left out.
But I can't help but be curious, what's exactly the terminology of the guy in discussion? Was he not understanding the major real distinction in the same way Bradshaw was?
I guess you'll have to ask a specialist in later scholasticism in Scotus or Suarez.
Sorry if I was unclear, I meant about the Thomist, on what I presume to be a thomist understanding of what a major real distinction meant. Well, I can put it like this, when you said that the distinction between essence and energies and between the energies themselves is a major real distinction, did you mean in the same sense of how Bradshaw writes in the paper?